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Secondary Boycotts: The Ally-
Doctrine Revisited
Lester Asher'
INTRODUCTION
The so-called "secondary boycott" provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act generally prohibit a union from exerting economic
pressure on a "person" with the object of forcing that person to "cease
doing business" with "any other person." 2  The question addressed by
this article is one which at first blush appears to be relatively easy to re-
solve: who is entitled to the protection of this provision as an "other
person."' 3  As simple as the question may sound, both the National
1. Partner in the law firm of Asher, Greenfield, Gubbins and Segall, Chicago,
Illinois; B.A. 1930, J.D. 1932, University of Chicago. The author acknowledges the
help of Stephen B. Rubin, an associate in his firm, in the research and preparation of
this article.
2. Section 8(b) (4) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, 29 U.S.C.
Section 158(b)(4)(B), makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "(i) to engage
in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the
course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services;
or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an indus-
try affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is . . . (B) forcing or
requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing
in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing
business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize
or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such
labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under
the provisions of Section 9: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall
be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or
primary picketing .... "
3. Section 2(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 152(l), provides that when used
in the Act, "[t]he term 'person' includes one or more individuals, labor organizations,
partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bank-
ruptcy, or receivers."
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Labor Relations Board and the courts have grappled with it, in my
opinion, often without success.
There is a crying need for clarity in answering this question. Labor
organizations, and to a certain degree, employers, plan their strike
tactics and bargaining postures with a view to how far economic pres-
sure may be extended in the event of a breakdown in bargaining nego-
tiations. Moreover, from the point of view of the unions, there is a
potential economic liability, as well as the threat of injunction proceed-
ings, if the wrong decision is made.4
It has been recognized, albeit all too infrequently, that there are two
essentially different concepts involved in the notion of who is an "other
person." First, by definition, the same person cannot be an "other
person" and so, pressure brought upon a single employer to stop
dealing in its own products or services is not unlawful under this provi-
sion. However, what constitutes a "single employer" is one of the
more difficult problems which the NLRB and the courts continue to
face. Second, by both evolving case law and common sense, a totally
separate individual may became so embroiled in the dispute of the
primary employer that he becomes "allied" with the primary, and his
dealings with the primary are therefore not entitled to the protection
of this section of the Act.5 This is the so-called "ally-doctrine" in its
pure sense.
In an earlier article prepared for a symposium conducted by the
Georgetown Law Journal,6 the writer reviewed the evolving case law of
both of these questions and concluded that the National Labor Rela-
tions Board was neither addressing the true issues nor attempting to
rationalize clearly its decisions. Unfortunately, a second formal re-
view of these concepts does not provide for a much more charitable
evaluation.7
4. Section 303 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 187 provides for damage actions in the Federal District Courts against labor orga-
nizations which engage in unlawful activity within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(B),
and Section 10(1) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, 29 U.S.C. Section
160(1) provides that the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board shall
seek injunction proceedings where a meritorious charge under Section 8(b)(4)(B) is
brought. Furthermore, identical issues arise, although less concretely, under Section
8(e), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(e), which prohibits an employer and a union from entering
into an agreement for the employer to "cease doing business with any other person."
5. Senator Taft said, in the debates, "The spirit of the Act is not intended to
protect a man who . . . is cooperating with a primary employer and taking his work
and doing the work which he is unable to do because of the strike." 95 Cong. Rec.
8709 (1947).
6. Secondary Boycotts-Allied, Neutral and Single Employers, 52 GEORGETOWN
L.J. 406 (1964).
7. Following the decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
Truck Drivers Union Local 413, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. N.L.R.B.,
334 F.2d 539 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964), the NLRB has modified its
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THE SINGLE EMPLOYER CONCEPT
A frequent point of confusion is in failing to distinguish between
the totally separate concepts of "single employer" and "allied em-
ployer." The "single employer" notion has its origin in the per-
manent relationship between economic entities; it does not arise out
of or at the point of a labor dispute. On the other hand, the concept
of an "allied employer" presupposes that there is a totally separate and
distinct entity or enterprise which, absent its involvement in the parti-
cular labor dispute, would be entitled to protection by Section 8(b)
(4) (B). Thus, in analyzing these problems, the NLRB and the courts
should first address themselves to the question of whether they are
dealing with a single entity or two different entities. This distinction is
often ignored and too seldom even recognized."
The question of "single employer" is entirely a policy decision as to
whether an enterprise is so closely related to the primary or struck em-
ployer that pressure upon it may lawfully be applied. Since this is a
policy question, the writer must confess his bias in that he represents, as
legal counsel, unions which are actual or potential respondents in many
of these cases. However, certain normatively neutral statements can be
made so that a consistent policy judgment can be brought to bear.
The "single employer" issue may arise in several different contexts.
Without attempting to enumerate all of the potential economic rela-
tionships that may arise between enterprises, the ones treated here are
among the more common and are seen in the case literature.
a. Vertical or "straight line" integration of operations. A manu-
facturer may have associated with it a warehousing or distribution
enterprise and various retail enterprises, all of which principally
deal in the product of the manufacturer. This form of integration
may take place under the rubric of a single corporation with sepa-
rate divisions, of separate corporations under a single holding com-
rationale in Teamsters Local 413 (Patton Warehouse), 140 NLRB 1474 (1963), criti-
cized in the earlier article.
8. "We need not here determine whether the relationship between Acme and Twin
County is one of 'single employer' or 'ally'. It is sufficient that Acme and Twin County
have such identity and community of interests as negative the claim that Acme is a
neutral employer." Teamsters Local 282 (Acme Concrete and Supply Corp.), 137
NLRB 1321, 1324 (1962). "[W]here the primary and secondary employers, although
separate legal entities, are commonly owned or controlled or are engaged in closely
integrated operations, they would be regarded, under certain circumstances, as a single
employer under the Act and hence 'allies' .. ..... United Steelworkers of America
(Tennessee Coal & Iron) 127 NLRB 823, 824 (1960). In this case, the Board also
attempted to define the "ally" relationship growing out of the performance of struck
work. Id. at 825. See also United Board of Carpenters (J.G. Roy and Sons), 118
NLRB 286, 287 (1957): ". . . were one and the same employer . .. or . . .were
so allied .. . as to warrant finding that Roy Construction was not a neutral employer
wholly unconcerned in the primary dispute."
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pany, or of separate corporations commonly owned and controlled.'
b. Horizontal integration. All of the related enterprises are at the
same operating level and may involve such "chain" operations as
retail stores or newspaper publishers. Again, there may be com-
mon ownership and control of each of the chain locations or each
of them may be separately owned and operated.10
c. Conglomerates. Here there may be product differentiation
among different manufacturers or operating companies, but there
is common financial control which economically strengthens each
of the separate enterprises in the event of a labor dispute.
d. The general contractor-subcontractor relationship. In the
typical situation this does not involve common ownership. The
control exerted by the general over a subcontractor, limited to a
particular job or series of jobs, has usually been protected from in-
volvement in a labor dispute of the other, unless the one entity
becomes "allied" as a result of, or in preparation for, a strike."
e. Lessor and Lessee. Relationships of this kind are relatively
common in trucking operations where the so-called independent
contractor leases a truck and the lessor retains elements of actual or
potential control over the operations. The whole enterprise may
be carried on in one or several names.
f. Loan agreements with rights to control the debtor's operations.
Sometimes the rights are express. Sometimes the extension of
credit without security or written document is considered proof
that there is less than arms-length dealing between companies.
12
g. Spinoff of previously integrated operations.13
The enumeration of these relations suggests some basic factors which
should be considered in evaluating the "neutrality" of a secondary per-
son. Some of these factors have been found controlling by the Board,
but others have been ignored. Too often, the NLRB has concentrated
on the issues of common ownership and common day-to-day control
which are relevant to the determination of "single employer" status for
the purpose of deciding whether the NLRB may assert jurisdiction
under its jurisdictional standards, or in deciding bargaining units.
9. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 810, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Sid
Harvey, Inc. and Sid Harvey Brooklyn Corp.) 189 NLRB No. 93, enforcement denied,
460 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1972).
10. See, e.g., Miami Newspapers Printing Pressmen Local No. 46 (Knight News-
papers, Inc.) 138 NLRB 1346 (1962), enf'd, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963); and
Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69 (San Francisco Examiner Division of the
Hearst Corporation) 185 NLRB No. 25 (1970), enfd 443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971).
11. See, e.g., NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S.
675, 689 (1951), United Steelworkers of America (Tennessee Coal & Iron) 127 NLRB
823 (1960) enf'd as modified, 294 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
12. See, e.g., Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Acme Concrete),
137 NLRB 1321 (1962), where the factors included shared premises without rent, fam-
ily control (although not ownership of both), virtually total straight-line segregation and
loans without security.
13. See, e.g., Vulcan Materials Co. v. Steelworkers, 430 F.2d 446 (5th Cir., 1970).
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These considerations are less helpful, and sometimes misleading,
in resolving questions of "neutrality."
1. Whether there is operational integration among the various parts
of the enterprise has always been considered relevant. The "vertical"
enterprise was early recognized as one, 14 and this factor is usually
controlling even where ownership is not identical, but related.' 5 Where
separate businesses are set up merely for the purpose of limiting liability
of the stockholders in the event of financial disaster or for tax savings,
but all of the arms operate to promote a single product line, unity is
found. However, in a recent decision the NLRB ignored the common
product, integration of function and common ownership, and focused
on the largely irrelevant factor of "day-to-day control," particularly
control of labor relations, even looking to so particular a question as
the benefits of employees of the various units. 6
2. Day-to-day control by a common owner or parent company,
particularly in the area of labor relations, would clearly nullify the
neutrality of the enterprises. However, in making this the sole criterion
of parent-subsidiary neutrality, 17 the NLRB has too narrowly limited the
proper range of its inquiry. The Board has blinded itself to overall
economic control implicit in the dependence of commonly owned
entities, or has dismissed these considerations as only indicative of "po-
tential," rather than "actual or active" control."8
3. The major factor which the Board seems to ignore is the financial
integration between enterprises, particularly that found in a conglomerate
organization. The willingness and ability of an employer to resist
bargaining demands by a union to a very large extent depends upon the
financial resources available to it, the extent to which it may be sub-
14. National Union of Maritime Cooks (Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co.) 87 NLRB 54,
56, 83 (1949).
15. See, e.g., Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Acme Concrete)
137 NLRB 1321 (1962), where the stone and gravel business was set up on the same
premises principally to supply the ready-mix concrete company with materials. Three
brothers operated both businesses, which were found not "neutral," even though the
ready-mix company was separately owned.
16. Steel Fabricators Local 810 (Sid Harvey, Inc.) 189 NLRB No. 93 (1971),
enforcement denied, 460 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1972); see also, Kaynard v. Local 810 (Sid
Harvey, Inc.) 74 LRRM 2789 (1970).
However, in Local No. 235, Lithographers and Photoengravers (Henry Wurst, Inc.)
187 NLRB No. 63 (1970), the Board easily recognized as a single enterprise family-
owned separate corporations on the same premises where 75% of the printing company's
bindery and mailing work was performed by the related companies.
17. Miami Newspapers Printing Pressmen Local No. 46 (Knight Newspapers, Inc.)
138 NLRB 1346 (1962) enf'd, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
18. See, e.g., Miami Newspapers Printing Pressmen Local No. 46 (Knight News-
papers, Inc.), 138 NLRB 1346, 1347-51 (1962), enfd, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir.
1963); Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local 639 (Poole's Warehousing) 158 NLRB
1281, 1286 (1966); International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Local 179 (Alexander
Warehouse) 128 NLRB 916, 919 (1960).
297
1973
Loyola University Law Journal
sidized by other related organizations, and the potential for diversion of
its operations to other enterprises.' 9 In a conglomerate organization,
management asserts its strength from its potential to subsidize. To
wait until one portion of the conglomerate octopus has come to the
aid and assistance of another (that is, "ally" itself) focuses on a point
in time which is too late. The superior bargaining strength of the em-
ployer may have already been brought to bear to force capitulation by
the union. The recognition of this reality would permit the union to
exert its strength against the full economic resources arrayed against it
without waiting for their commitment to the combat.
4. Where the enterprise or enterprises, even if separately owned,
hold themselves out to the public as a single enterprise, it is not unfair
to treat them as such in the event of a labor dispute. The union acts at
its peril in extending a picket line, and may be assessed damages for
making the wrong determination.2" Where the enterprise has turned
a common face to the general public, the union should not be required
to examine corporate books, other records and documents to determine
if it is dealing with separately owned or controlled employers. The em-
ployers in this situation have for various reasons chosen to be treated
as one, and it is not unfair in this context to do so.
19. The conglomerate merger movement has shifted tactical collective bargain-
ing power in favor of the management. In dealing with the many national
unions it typically faces, management can cross-subsidize between industries
and plants and whipsaw different unions at its varied facilities-supported by
substantially enhanced financial staying power. 'Deep pocket' staying power
applies to labor markets as well as product markets. In contrast to its behavior
in product markets, management can exercise its wider range of options in
dealing with unions free from any restraint which may emanate from fear of
anti-trust prosecution. Alexander, Conglomerate Mergers and Collective Bar-
gaining, 24 IND. AND LAB. REL. REV. 354, 362 (1971).
Compare the following from the Decision of Trial Examiner Marx in the San Fran-
cisco Examiner case:
The 'operating profits' made by the Hearst divisions are fuel for the total
corporate body and, together with other economic resources of the Corpora-
tion, are available at its will to sustain any division in a contest of legitimate
economic pressures involved in a labor dispute between a union and the man-
agement of the division or, in other words, with Hearst. The right and power
of the Corporation to muster its economic resources to such an end, irrespective
of their divisional source, underscores the need for recognition of a correlative
right in the union to engage in 'otherwise' lawful picketing of premises of the
Corporation other than the dispute situs. Such recognition gives balancing
effect to the 'dual congressional objectives,' reflected in the harnessing of the
proviso of Section 8(b)(4)(B) to the prohibitions of the section, of preserving
the right of employees to bring economic pressure to bear upon their employer
in a dispute they have with him, while shielding other employers 'wholly
unconcerned' in the dispute from such a tactic." 185 NLRB No. 25 (1970),
TXD Slip op. at 24.
In Madden v. Local 743, Teamsters (Aetna Plywood), 43 LRRM 2472 (E.D.
Wisc. 1959), the court's opinion appears to have adopted this analysis. However, this
was prior to the Board's Hearst decisions, infra note 21.
20. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Local 273 v. Atlas Sheet Metal Co. of Jackson-
ville, 384 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1967) confirming a jury award of more than $2,600.
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The narrowness of the Labor Board's point of view and its devotion
to poorly-reasoned precedent came to fruition in the Hearst cases,
decided in 1970.21 In these cases, the Board was called upon to decide
for the first time whether separate divisions of a single corporation could
be neutral "persons" within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (B). Only
the Board's mania for limiting the situs of primary picketing can explain
the outcome of these cases.
In the San Francisco Examiner case, some eight unions on strike
against the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner division of the Hearst Cor-
poration extended their picket line to San Francisco, there picketing the
offices of the San Francisco Examiner. They also picketed the San
Francisco Chronicle, a separate employer which was engaged in a joint
printing company enterprise with San Francisco Examiner, and they
picketed the premises of the jointly-run printing company. In the
Baltimore News case, the Television and Radio Artists Union extended
its picket line in Baltimore, Maryland, from Radio Station WBAL, a
division of the Hearst Corporation, with which it had a dispute, to the
premises of the Baltimore News American, another division of the
Hearst Corporation within the same city. In both cases, the Regional
Directors for the respective regions sought and obtained preliminary in-
junctions under the provisions of Section 10(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act.22
The corporate relationship between the Hearst Corporation and its
newspaper and other divisions was elaborated in the respective trial
examiners' decisions. These decisions reveal enormous economic con-
trol by the Hearst offices in New York. The president and Board of
Directors of Hearst Corporation appointed the operating heads of each
of the divisions, required regular reports of the financial status of each
division, demanded that all profits in excess of ordinary operating ex-
penses and a certain reserve for emergencies be remitted to the parent,
and made and passed upon all capital expenditures in excess of $10,000.
Moreover, the Hearst Corporation made interest-free loans, termed
"down-stream advances" to those divisions with temporary operating
21. Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69 (San Francisco Examiner, Division
of the Hearst Corporation), 185 NLRB No. 25 (1970), enf'd 443 F.2d 1173 (9th
Cir. 1971); American Federation of Television and Radio Artists Washington-Balti-
more Local, AFL-CIO (Baltimore News American Division, the Hearst Corporation)
185 NLRB No. 26 (1970), enf'd, 462 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
22. Kennedy v. San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild, 69 LRRM (N.D. Calif.
1968) affd 412 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1969), and Penello v. American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists, 291 F. Supp. 409 (D. Md. 1968). It may be of
more than passing interest that both of these Regional Directors have now been ele-
vated to membership on the NLRB.
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losses. No cash was ever remitted on transactions between operating
divisions of the Hearst Corporation; these transactions were handled as
paper entries only.
With respect to the newspaper operations, final authority over such
items as editorial endorsements for the President of the United States were
lodged in the president of the Corporation, who, for these purposes,
was called the "Editor in Chief," and whose column was run on a
syndicated basis by the newspaper divisions. Further, the New York
office had made the decision for the San Francisco Examiner to enter
into the joint enterprise with the Chronicle to set up and operate the
printing company, as it made all decisions on major capital expenditures.
The operations of the newspaper divisions evidenced also a large
degree of vertical or "straight-line" integration. Thus, other divisions
of the Hearst Corporation, such as the King Features Syndicate, the
Hearst Enterprises, the Hearst Headline Service, the Hearst Wire Service,
the Hearst Washington Bureau and the Hearst Advertising Service
provided essential parts of the product that was sold at comer newstands.
The Hearst Enterprises provided all of the newsprint for the Los Angeles
Herald Examiner and other newspaper operations which, unlike the San
Francisco Examiner, did not have separate access to relatively inexpen-
sive sources of newsprint. The King Features Syndicate and the other
services of the Hearst Corporation provided features, advertising services,
etc., for both the Los Angeles and San Francisco newspapers, as well as
other newspapers in the Hearst chain.
There were even to a certain extent some aspects of the public use of
the common name. Thus, although not mentioned in either trial
examiner's decision, presumably the name of the common "Editor in
Chief' and Publisher would be found on the masthead of each of the
newspapers. In the Baltimore News case, moreover, the radio station
identified itself on the air as "the News American station" and "affiliated
with the News American" with direct lines to "the News American and
NBC." Writers and columnists of the News American were used as
commentators and panel guests on the radio station under arrangements
found to be those of "independent contractors."
Without going into these details of operating and financial control
and integration, the Board proclaimed the rule that "separate corporate
subsidiaries are separate persons, each entitled to the protection of Sec-
tion 8 (b) (4) (B) from the labor disputes of the other, if neither the sub-
sidiaries nor the parent exercises actual or active, as opposed to merely
potential, control over the day-to-day operations or labor relations of
300
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the other. '23  The Board then spent the rest of the decision justifying
the same rule for corporate divisions as it had just proclaimed for cor-
porate subsidiaries. However, there was precious little support for the
subsidiary rule proclaimed by the Board and a weak case for the assertion
that the same corporate person could be split up into a multitude of
"persons" cloaked with neutrality in the labor disputes of the others.
In support of its assertion of the rule for subsidiaries, the Board cited
its own decision in Knight Newspapers,24 the trial examiner's decision in
Poole's Warehousing25 (a sparse factual record, not even involving
subsidiaries, in which the Board adopted a rather routine decision of
the trial examiner) the Court of Appeals' reversals of the Roy and Sons
and Bachman cases, 6 and the Board's own decision in Alexander Ware-
house, 7 in which no neutrality had been found. It is significant that
while the distinction between "actual or active" as opposed to merely
"potential" control was enunciated in some of these cases, the Board's
emphasis upon day-to-day control and particularly upon control of
day-to-day labor relations policy was an entirely new element in the
Hearst test, not found in the previous cases.
The reliance upon its own decision in Alexander Warehouse, while
misplaced, unfortunately evidences the prescience of the writer in criti-
cizing that decision in the writer's earlier article. In Alexander Ware-
house, the unions had a dispute with the company in Joliet, Illinois, and
proceeded to picket other warehouses of the same employer located
in Urbana and Peoria, Illinois, two other downstate Illinois com-
munities. While the Board found that the Peoria and Urbana ware-
houses were not cloaked with neutrality, the particular significance for
this case is that the Board emphasized the elements of common super-
vision and control, rather than the fact that all three warehouses were
owned by one and the same employer. Thus, the pregnant negative
produced a deformed offspring in the Hearst case, where Alexander
Warehouse is cited for the proposition that separate locations of the
same employer must be treated as neutrals if there is no common
supervision, and that common ownership is not significant.
The Hearst decisions were promulgated notwithstanding the strenuous
dissent of member Brown and the eloquent decision of Trial Examiner
23. 185 NLRB No. 25, Slip op. at 4.
24. See supra n.17.
25. See supra n.18.
26. J. G. Roy & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771 (1st Cir. 1958), reversing 118
NLRB 286 (1957); Bachman Machine Co. v. NLRB; 266 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1959),
reversing 121 NLRB 1229 (1958).
27. See supra n.18.
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Herman Marx in the San Francisco Examiner case. These opinions
persuasively argued that where all of the corporate profits are centrally
funneled off, and particularly where the central entity has the power to
subsidize a struck employer for the duration of a strike in order to
obtain concessions from a union, which will then inure to the benefit
of the corporate enterprise, these divisions should not be treated as
"wholly unconcerned in the dispute" or "neutral."2" However, the Board
passed off these considerations and appears to have adopted the reason-
ing of Trial Examiner Samuel M. Singer in the Baltimore News American
case that the true test of neutrality is that a "primary" employer is one
who is in a position to grant the union's demands and to resolve the
underlying dispute, and that since bargaining was carried on with one
division only, that division was the only primary. 29 However, this
argument proves too much; it undercuts the ground upon which stand
the "straight-line" or "integrated operation" line of cases in which the
Board has always recognized that the close, intimate and substantial
relationship between ostensibly separate employers removes their claim to
neutrality, even though the union is bargaining with only one of them
at a time.
While the writer submits that the Knight Newspapers case was
wrongly decided in that it wholly ignored the financial relationship of
the newspapers in the Knight chain, that case, even if correctly decided,
provides scant support for the Board's decision in Hearst. Whereas in
Knight Newspapers there was very little dealing between the various
newspapers and evidence of only about 2% of purchases centrally, the
Hearst organization was obviously developed with the object of realizing
purchasing economies for the various local newspapers through Hearst
enterprises, improving the product and differentiating it from others
through the services of the Washington Bureau, the Features Syndicate
and the News Service, and, in turn, enhancing the position of those
28. A further consideration not expressed in either Member Brown's dissent or Trial
Examiner Marx's decision is that the central enterprise can, by resisting a strike at
one division, obtain concessions from the unions which will be applied at other divi-
sions. While all employers which are in competition have an interest in the outcome of
the negotiations, and could not be held involved for this reason alone, the immediacy
of the "tandem" relationship within related enterprises is significant. Thus, the relevant
factor is not active control over day-to-day labor relations policies, but the ability(potential) to affect collective bargaining postures.
29. Trial Examiner Singer's decision contains the even more astounding proposition
that the News American and WBAL were "competitors" for advertising revenue, etc.
See also the Court of Appeals decision, 462 F.2d at 891. This assertion is a distortion
of the term "competition" as it is commonly used, and totally ignores the movement for
concentration of news media, particularly by newspaper enterprises, in all major news
markets. The News American and WBAL received advertising revenue not from
"competition" but from the advertisers' desires to reach both markets, newspaper and
AM radio.
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providers of services in their dealings with non-Hearst enterprises.
That the Board could have cited the absence of these factors in the
Knight case in support of its decision and yet totally ignored them in
the Hearst case indicated the deep-seated desire of the Board to isolate
the situs of the dispute, regardless of economic realities. This desire
totally ignores the equally persuasive factor of allowing the union to
exert as much influence as there is interest in the dispute.
The simplistic approach to dealing with the intricacies of modern
corporate and financial interdependence was carried further in the Sid
Harvey case.30  Although the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the Board's pro forma adoption of the trial examiner's state-
ment that "the precise (and only) question is whether the corporations
are under the actual control of Stephen Harvey, as distinguished from
his potential control, 3 1 it is not safe to assume that the Board has been
deterred from the misapplication of illogical slogans in order to isolate
the locus of labor disputes.3 2
THE ALLY-DOCTRINE
By the time we reach the question of whether one employer is
"allied" with another, we have presumably already determined that he
is separate and distinct from the struck employer. We are here dealing
with an employer who has done or wants to "do business" with a
struck or primary employer, but the union seeks to interfere with this
relationship and requests that he terminate or fail to commence that
relationship. Generally speaking, such an employer is protected by
Section 8(b) (4) (B). However, if by his undertaking to perform
30. Local 810, Teamsters (Sid Harvey, Inc.) 189 NLRB No. 93 (1971), enforce-
ment denied 460 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1972) cert. denied - U.S. - (1972).
31. Id. The Court of Appeals decision by Judge Hays said:
Neutrality, for purposes of the Act, is not a technical concept. To determine
whether an employer is neutral involves a common sense evaluation of the
relationship between the two employers who are being picketed. In me-
chanically applying a 'day-to-day' test in this case, the Board engaged in a
technical exercise in the intricacies of corporate structure rather than a realistic,
common sense evaluation of neutrality.
The Sid Harvey organization is essentially an integrated complex which manu-
factures, distributes, and sells a limited number of products. Ownership and
control of the five corporations is centralized or overlapping. The daily con-
tact among the corporations is extensive, and the operation and success of
each is interrelated with and heavily dependent upon the other members of
the group performing their assigned tasks. Only in the most strained and
technical sense could the picketed employers be characterized as neutral.
460 F.2d at 6.
32. In one of the latest cases decided at the time of this writing, the Board sought
and was granted temporary injunctive relief, relying on the Hearst cases, where labor
relations experts of one corporate division were used by another. Phillips v. Local
391, Teamsters. 70 CCH Labor Cases 13,371 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
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struck work or otherwise, he lends assistance to the struck employer to
see the struck employer through the strike, pressure may, in some
cases, lawfully be brought to bear upon him. 33
The mere performance of struck work by the secondary employer
is not, and should not be, enough to make him an ally. This con-
clusion is dictated by the economic fact that one who seeks to divert
business away from the struck business on a permanent basis is a
competitor, not an ally. Competitors are for these purposes "neutral."
Moreover, a union would ordinarily want to see pressure brought to
bear upon the primary by the diversion of his work to one of his
competitors.
Since the mere performance of struck work by another enterprise
is not sufficient to ally him with the primary, then it is necessary for
the struck employer to benefit in some way from the performance of
the struck work by the secondary. But the Board and Courts have
proceeded from this logical premise to engraft additional conditions on
the ally-doctrine. For example, in the NLRB formulation there must
be an "arrangement" for the performance of the struck work, 4 initiated
by the struck employer,35 and some cases further require that the ally
must "supplant" the work of the striking employees, 6 and that the
primary must pay for the performance of the work. 7
The engrafting of additional conditions seems to follow partly from
a need in the first place to articulate a specific "test" to rationalize the
33. See United Steelworkers of America (Tennessee Coal & Iron) 127 NLRB 823,
824-25 (1960), en'd as modified, 294 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
Nor is it necessary for the "struck work" to be new work for the ally. Mere continu-
ance of an existing relationship may constitute the performance of "struck work" after
the commencement of a strike. Cf. Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects
(Ebasco Services, Inc.) 75 F. Supp. 672, 21 LRRM 2256 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). In that
lead opinion Judge Rifkind found:
• . . Project's employees did work which, but for the strike of Ebasco's em-
ployees, would have been done by Ebasco. The economic effect upon Ebasco's
employees was precisely that which would flow from Ebasco's hiring strike-
breakers to do work on its premises. The conduct of the union in inducing
Project's employees to strike is not different in kind from its conduct in
inducing Ebasco's employees to strike. 21 LRRM at 2260.
However, the "struck work" must at least be work which the primary would ordi-
narily have done, rather than work customarily subcontracted. See Metal Polishers
Local 171 (Climax Machinery) 86 NLRB 1243 (1949).
34. Truck Drivers Local 413 (Patton Warehouse), 140 NLRB 1474, 1483 (1963),
enf'd in this aspect, 334 F.2d 539, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1964) cert. denied 379 U.S. 916
(1964). See also Local 379, Teamsters (Catalano Bros.), 175 NLRB 459, 460 (1969).
35. See Laborers Local 859 (Thomas S. Byrne, Inc.) 180 NLRB 502 (1969),
enforcement denied in this respect, 446 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
36. See NLRB v. Western States Council, Woodworkers, 319 F.2d 655, 657-58 (9th
Cir. 1963), enforcing 137 NLRB 352 (1962).
37. See Warehouse Union Local 6, ILWU (Hershey Chocolate), 153 NLRB 1051,
1062 (1965) enfd 378 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967). See also NLRB v. Business Machine
Local 459, (Royal Typewriter) 228 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1955, concurring opinion of
Judge Hand).
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decision, and secondly, from approaching such a "test" in subsequent
cases as divinely inspired. For example, in the Royal Typewriter case,
Royal had service contracts with its customers to repair Royal typewrit-
ers. When the union struck and prevented Royal employees from per-
forming repair work, service contract customers were told by Royal to
have the work done elsewhere and to send the bills to Royal for payment.
The Board's order against the union's picketing the independent repair
companies was denied enforcement by a three-judge panel of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Lumbard, with whom Judge Medina
apparently agreed, emphasized the interest of the union in preventing
Royal's work from knowingly being done by the independents who could
easily -extricate themselves from the dispute by refusing to accommodate
Royal. There appears to have been little competition between Royal and
the independents for this work, since the customers were on service
contracts to Royal, and the business would ultimately return to Royal.
Judge Lumbard found the lack of a direct arrangement between Royal
and the independents not controlling."8 However, this seems not to
have satisfied Judge Hand, who insisted that the critical factor was
Royal's payment to the picketed independents. As the writer has
earlier noted,39 there would have been no economic difference had the
customers paid for the repairs and service and merely deducted those
amounts from their contract payments to Royal.4" But in order to
obtain Judge Hand's concurrence, the "holding" of Judge Lumbard,
unsupported by anything else either he or Judge Medina wrote, incor-
porates the element of payment by the struck employer.4 The element
of payment by the primary employer is thereafter slavishly recited as
part of the "ally test."42
Again, the "arrangement" test, as the writer has previously noted,4 "
is artificial because it fails to consider the possibility that the "secondary"
employer will purposefully assist the struck employer without being
asked and without expecting permanent retention of the new business.
This possibility inheres in an oligopolistic market, where none of the
"competitors" wishes to increase his ultimate market share for rea-
sons of friendship, antitrust liability and other considerations. Cer-
tainly, it makes no sense to require, as the Board seems to, that the
38. Accord, Laborers Local 859 v. NLRB (Thomas S. Byrne, Inc.) 446 F.2d 1319
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
39. 52 GEORGETOWN L.J. at 409.
40. Accord, Laborers Local 859 v. NLRB, supra n.38.
41. 288 F.2d at 559.
42. See Hershey Chocolate, supra n.37.
43. 52 GEORGETOWN L.J. at 409.
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performance of the struck work must be at the request of the struck
employer, as opposed to the customers. 44
The NLRB's growing ritualism and dependence upon formal ex-
pressions of "doctrine" is further exemplified by the Hershey Chocolate
case.45  Although the traditional formulation of the ally-doctrine is
that the performance of struck work is one of the ways in which an
employer may ally itself with the primary disputant,46 cases like Her-
shey Chocolate indicate that no other like situations will be considered.
In Hershey Chocolate, the employer had maintained warehouse space
at San Francisco for its products. The warehouse employees were rep-
resented by the Union. The employer decided to begin construction of
a new manufacturing and warehousing facility in Oakdale, 100 miles
away. In the meantime, the employer decided to terminate its own
warehousing operation, lay off its employees, and have the warehousing
operation performed by employees of Encinal Warehouse at the latter's
facility in San Leandro. The Union requested preferential hiring of its
members at the new Oakdale facility and also claimed bargaining rights
for all warehouse employees at the new Oakdale facility. Receiving
no favorable reply, it informed Encinal of the dispute and commenced
picketing Encinal, all of the goods having previously been removed from
the former warehouse to Encinal. The Union also induced the Encinal
employees to stop working on Hershey goods.
In response to the secondary boycott charge against it, the Union
claimed that Encinal was an "ally" of Hershey, the "struck" employer.
The trial examiner, in a decision approved pro forma by the NLRB,
held that Hershey was not "struck" since it had no employees any
longer, and that Encinal was not performing "struck work" because at
the time of consummating the lease, there was no strike.47
This formalistic approach assumes that only by carefully adhering
to each condition of the traditional Board formulation of the ally-doctrine
can one employer ally itself with the primary disputant. However,
this ignores the fact that the Union had represented a unit of employees
and was seeking to preserve its bargaining rights, in the face of the
employer's refusal to continue dealings. As the Union's signs said
44. Laborers Local 859 v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1971) reversing in
this respect 180 NLRB 502 (1969).
45. Warehouse Union Local 6, ILWU (Hershey Chocolate), 153 NLRB 1051 (1965),
enf'd. 378 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967).
46. An otherwise neutral employer becomes an ally when he "engages in conduct
which is inconsistent with his professed neutrality in the dispute such as performing
the farmed out struck work ...... Tennessee Coal & Iron, supra n.33 at 825 (em-
phasis added.)
47. 153 NLRB at 1063-64.
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"Hershey Chocolate's running away from San Francisco to Oakdale with
this temporary stopover in San Leandro." The Board's approach also
ignores the fact that, although the primary employer had terminated its
employees, there was a real dispute between it and the Union. There
was no remaining location at which the Union could publicize its dispute
except the Encinal warehouse. Encinal was on notice that the Union had
a dispute with Hershey over the warehouse work, and Encinal knew that
the work would not permanently be assigned to it because of the
construction of the new Hershey warehouse facility. Encinal was acting
as a mere accommodation for Hershey in its apparent effort to rid itself
of the Union. There seems to be no other reason for the termination
of the San Francisco warehousing operation prior to the construction of
the new manufacturing and warehouse facility in Oakdale. When
Encinal put itself in this relationship with Hershey and the Union,
and when it provided the only Northern California location of Hershey
goods, it had scant claim to protection from the Union's pressure.
However, the Board's formal application of its limited "struck work"
doctrine afforded this protection.48
The Hershey Chocolate result is astonishing when compared with
the Board's determination in Auburndale Freezer49 that in substantially
similar circumstances the warehouse became a "common situs" at
which the Union could lawfully picket with similar signs, identify-
ing the owner of the warehouse goods as the primary disputant. The
Board dismissed the trial examiner's reliance on Hershey Chocolate
and other "ally" cases, saying only that the "common situs" issue was
not raised in Hershey. Notably, the Board did not say that Hershey
had been wrongly decided, thus exalting linguistic form over substance.
One would have thought that the Auburndale warehouse, at which there
was no increase of business during the strike and due to the strike,
would have been entitled to more protection than Encinal, which was en-
gaged in the performance of the disputed work of the primary, knowing
the assignment to be a temporary accommodation for Hershey. But the
48. Sometimes, the blindness to the rationale of the ally-doctrine is explicit. See
e.g., Local 868, Teamsters (Mercer Storage Co.), 156 NLRB 67, at 70 (1965): "To
be sure, the purpose and effect of storing Mid-County's cars at Mercer was to avoid
the impact of the lawful picketing at Mid-County and assist the latter in combating the
strike. But under the present statute, as authoritatively construed, these considerations
do not amount to legal justification for involving the neutral employer in a labor con-
troversy to which he is otherwise a stranger." (Emphasis added.) If the purpose of
the accommodation is to assist in combating the strike, then what justification, legal
or otherwise, is there for isolating the secondary from the effects of the dispute?
49. United Steelworkers of America (Auburudale Freezer Corp.), 177 NLRB 791
(1969), reversed, 434 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1970).
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Board, without attempting to reconcile the cases, merely said in Auburn-
dale that what you call it makes all the difference. The Steelworkers
in the Auburndale case picked the correct label; the Longshoremen and
Warehousemen's Union in the Hershey case picked the wrong one.
CONCLUSION
The NLRB has failed to mend its ways, and it persists in confusing
allied and single employer situations. In addition, the Board keeps
stretching the facts for the purpose of finding that a subsidiary or
division of the same corporation is another person. The result in short
is that labor unions are being deprived of their statutory right to apply
economic pressure at the whole of an employer's enterprise.
